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will not lead to their appointed ends in a climate of moral indifferentism
and cynicism. Although the over-all picture of the economic status of the
family in the United States seems to be encouraging at this time it would
be dangerous indeed to take this fact alone as an excuse for relaxing our
concern for the future of a healthy family life in this country.

NATURAL LAW: MAN AND SOCIETY
HEINRICH A. ROMMEN*

F EW will deny that a genuine revival of Natural Law has occurred

everywhere in the Western World. What Etienne Gilson said, namely,
that the Natural Law always buries its undertakers, we see manifested
since the time of the First World War. Even before that great and
revolutionary event, more sensitive minds among the ruling schools of
legal positivism felt that positivism was unsatisfactory. Jurisprudence had
become a science without jus, just as psychology had become a science
without a soul, a psyche: Legal Positivism like its progenitor, universal
philosophical Positivism, flourishes in all its manifestations only, as history teaches us, under certain conditions. The human mind can only be
satisfied for a time, with that arid Positivism when State and Society
seem to be stable; when the mind is enthralled by the belief in unlimited
automatic progress guaranteed by the so efficient methods of the natural
science; and when a general placid feeling of security and saturation
prevails which thinks that all "problems" are soluble or even that
no "problems" exist because of the efficiency of the scientific methods.
Once this psychological and sociological condition is destroyed, once the
social and political order is shaken, once the "problems" arise and prove
impervious to the vaunted scientific methods, then the inefficiency of
Positivism becomes evident. It becomes evident also that the perpetual
quest for Justice can only be satisfied by the words that come from God,
be they the revealed words or His Logos, in the order of Universe and in
man's own nature.
To define law simply as the will of the State constitutionally formulated
-the main thesis of legal Positivism-is then utterly refuted when the
totalitarian State arises and destroys not only the social understructure of
legal Positivism but also radically decries the ideas of human basic rights
of personal dignity, of the autonomy of the family and the parental rights
which Positivism still allows to live on the outer margin as its inheritance of
an earlier period.
* PhfD., University of Bonn; LL.D., Boston College. Author of "The State in Catholic
Thought" and "The Natural Law." Member of the Faculty of the Graduate School, Georgetown University.
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Thus it is understandable that the Natural Law which, as so often before,
had, during the dominance of Positivism, found its home and refuge in the
philosophia perennis arose again, first after the First World War, and
then with renewed energy after the rise and the partial victory of the
totalitarian State; which was certainly the reductio ad absurdurn of
Positivism.
I
It is no wonder that in the country which we might rightly call the
classical country of Positivism, Germany, we find this revival of Natural
Law most clearly. Thus the President of the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic declared: "What was lacking in German administration of
justice was the inner motivation by the idea of justice and the belief
in ultimate obligatory and fundamental rules of Law... . Pure legal
Positivism is the most shallow foundation of Law. It has been proved
absurd wherever the totalitarian movement took possession of the lawmaking power of the State. It remains true that there are some fundamental, clear, universal, timeless, and unconditionally obliging juridical
principles." As a matter of fact, the German Supreme Court approved in
its decision of June 26, 1952, the decision of a lower court which had "for
the lack of a definite positive law, applied rules derived from the unchangeable Natural Law" basing its decision thus on the Natural Law.
Professor Karl Wahle, member of the Austrian Supreme Court declared
at the Charter meeting of the International Association of Judges in Salzburg (September 5, 1953): "A legislative act is then only Law when it is
in accord with moral principles. . . . These are not codified; they are
found by the Judge in his deciding of concrete cases and are declared in his
findings." Such quotations could be multiplied easily not only from the
sayings of practical judges, but also from professors of Law in Germany
where the old monopoly of positivism in legal thinking and in the administration of Justice is definitely broken. Of great interest, also, is the fact
that among protestant Theologians, even among those that belong to the
"Theology of Crisis" initiated by Karl Barth who with the AnalogiaEntis
denies the Natural Law, a new appreciation of the Natural Law may be
found, e.g. to mention only one-in Emil Brunner's "Justice" (that he
proposes to surrender the term Natural Law and substitute for it "Justice"
is certainly true; but the principles and basic rules which, according to
him, are the content of Justice are nothing else than those of the classical
Natural Law). Thus no longer can the acceptance of Natural Law
be declared to be based either explicitly or at least implicitly on Catholic Weltansckanung. On the contrary, Gustav Radbruch with humanistsocialist antecedents came also in the last years of his life to a much more
positive appreciation of the Natural Law.
A fortiori one is entitled to argue that in the countries where Legal
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Positivism never reached the kind of monopoly that it found in Germany,
Natural Law is again much more influential. This applies to France and
Italy and more so to the countries where the Common Law preserved all
through the centuries a profound respect for Natural Law-England and
the United States. Incontestably, we are experiencing a genuine return to
the Natural Law. Positivism, in its American form of legal pragmatism, has
lost its exclusive dominance. How could we ever resist the ruthless
Pragmatism, the radical Positivism of Communism for whom the law
is merely and exclusively a wholly politicized instrument of the omnipotent State by opposing it with a skeptical, nice, and unconvincing pragmatism of our own?
Yet the phrase "Return to the Natural Law" is understood by some
ambiguously. He who pleads for the Natural Law, though he might not
meet anymore the condescending attitude of sophisticated superiority, is
even today confronted with a certain diffident skepticism, certainly benevolent and polite, but still decisive. For the return to the Natural Law
arouses quickly the question at first somewhat baffling: To which Natural
Law? Though there is and can only be one Natural Law, the question is
justified. As with all great and fundamental ideas, so in the course of
history, the Natural Law has been abused politically and socially. Also,
historically, certain principles have been abstracted from the whole "organic" system of Natural Law and for political reasons have been exaggerated thus causing a grave distortion of the system itself.
What he who asks the question, "To what Natural Law should we
return?" means, is that he does not want a return to a Natural Law that
was highly and exaggeratedly individualistic, a Natural Law that was
abused up to the end of the 19th Century in order to invalidate all attempts for the realization of social justice; a Natural Law which was
identified with the Adam Smith socio-economic system of laissez-fairecapitalism; a Natural Law in which the rights of property in the form of
vested interests of the few were so highly protected that the personal
rights of the many were left unprotected; where the theory of the natural
rights as applied by the courts became de facto fetters for the realization
of the personal rights of the many, especially the workers. Those who felt
the contradiction between a democratic state with equal protection of the
Law for all on the one hand, and the absolutist organization of the factory
with no effective rights of the worker, saw in the theory of Natural Rights a
seemingly indestructible obstacle to their attempts for social justice. The
Natural Rights theory they encountered was so individualistic that the
equally social meaning of al rights, especially the social obligation of property, of a property that became more and more impersonal and irresponsible,
caused economic power to be completely forgotten. So many of the reformers, unfamiliar with the classical Natural Law, as it was at that time used by
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Catholic social reformers and by Leo XIII to give a sure basis for social
reform, all too quickly gave up the whole concept of Natural Rights and
declared all rights to be grants of the State falling thus for Rousseau's
potential totalitarian democracy and the All-Provider State, the greatest
danger to social rights.
II
What is the reason for this confusion which consists in the paradox
of the so-called individualist-conservative theory of Natural Law being
repudiated by the liberal reformers, such as by Leo XIII, who then fell
into the temptation of repudiating just that Natural Law from which originally stemmed their fundamental idea of social justice in their eagerness
for reform. Leo XIII used this repudiated idea of Natural Law efficiently,
fully aware at the same time of the dangers to these social rights from the
All-Provider State.
At the bottom of this paradoxical confusion lies a one-sidedly exaggerated idea of man's nature. Since the vatura humana (it may be permitted to use the latin term instead of the ambiguous "Human Nature")
is the basis of Natural Law, the paradox of various Natural Law systems explains itself by the fact that there are various theories of the
natura kumana. Ever since Hobbes, Locke and Adam Smith, all in thesi
adherents of Natural Law, we find an outspoken individualism in the
idea of man. Man is considered as self-centered, even as selfish; the
prosecution of his material self-interest and self-aggrandizement is his
very nature; man is not a social being deep in the center of his nature;
society is the result of utilitarian considerations based again on selfinterest. St. Thomas' often repeated thesis of an inborn, natural love of
man towards other men of a natural inclination of love for all men is
wholly foreign to these thinkers. All societies from the family to the State
have no genuine common good, as this is simply a nominalist term signifying the sum of the individual self-interests. If everything is left to
the free contracts of free men motivated only by their private self-interests, who never need take into consideration the common good of society,
then, as if directed by an invisible hand, every man in following only his
self-interest nevertheless realizes, though without ever intending it, the
common good, provided that the "governor" of competition regulates this
social mechanism. All human social relations and the social institutions
into which they solidify are basically of a contractual character under the
rule of a strict do ut des; the only form of justice is that of commutative
justice, the specific justice of contractual relations, established in the
market. Society is a network of contractual relations among free sellers
and buyers of goods and services measured in monetary terms by the law
of supply and demand; and this society organizes itself, so to speak,
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provided that the individuals are guaranteed freedom of property and of
contract by which they exchange their goods, services and labor, which is
considered as a commodity. Thus individual liberty, private property,
and free contracts become the only chapters of the "social" theory. All human social relations, if rational,--and irrational relations are frowned
upon-become contractual relations with a calculable self-interest determined do ut des. Even the vaunted benevolence of Bentham who repudiated
any Natural Law and the "Feelings of Sympathy" of others are still explained in terms of and founded on the self-interest of the individual. All
this is nothing else than the social theory of laissez-faire, of the "economic
man"; he becomes the archtype of what is called the capitalist era.
During this era the Natural Law, as a body of objective norms ruling
individual and all forms of social life, was not emphasized as much as the
Natural Law, as the natural rights of individuals in a highly individualist
sense. And this concept of Natural Rights, so productive in the critique
of the previous era of the mercantilist planned economy of the absolute
Prince and his paternalist policy toward the citizens as wards, now becomes, with the establishment of political democracy and the new economic society, its justifying and defending ideology. What were the
consequences of this contractural individualism and of this kind of Natural Rights Theory? The contractual view dominates all social forms. The
state becomes a Watchman; his main function is the protection of individual rights, of property and of contracts. It is declared to be the result
of a free contract, the social contract, from which the individuals may
recede, if their rights and their self-interest are interfered with. Marriage
and the family also are interpreted in the sense of this contractual view;
the spouses seek their self-interest after the sham of romantic love has
worn out and they are ready to rescind the marriage contract on the
slightest cause which positive laws eagerly provide. The family also is
threatened as a stable unit, with the marriage bond, objective in its essence, i.e. above the subjective whims, irrational expectations and selfish
interests of the members, as the old marriage oath . . . "until death us
do part," so significantly points out. In economic society where at least
the enterprise became tremendously important, the contractual view prevailed and thus shut off reality, namely, that the labor contract is not an
impersonal contract concerning the sale of a quasi-commodity, "labor,"
but that it establishes the entrance into a highly organized society in
which the worker spends half of his life-time and which the adepts of
human relations in industry have finally discovered. The worker and
the clerk did not simply and solely sell impersonal abstract labor-quantities but they entered an established productive society with a constitution,
originally that of the absolutism of the owner, now approaching more and
more that of a constitutional monarchy with representation and inde-
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pendent courts (grievance committees, union-representation, arbitrators)
and a Bill of Socio-Economic Rights. A factory is not only a dwelling
place of machines who are served by "hands," but it is a comparatively
stable society with all that this incurs, i.e. with a constitution, a body of
laws, with authority and obedience; with its own social interest, compounded of those of owners, managers, workers; with its collective passions and individual jealousies; with that intangible we call good spirit of
fellowship; and mutual cooperation with an autocratic or a democratic
"soul" and so on.
III
But for generations in the past this was not seen, just as it was not seen
that labor is not a commodity exchanged for wages as a price absolutely
determined by supply and demand in the labor market. In the freemarket economy, the logical but often hidden assumption is-and must
be-the approximate equality of bargaining power. This was often not
prevalent, especially before social legislation and free unionism came
about. Thus the feeling arose among labor of being exploited, of being the true risk-bearer because of lack of bargaining power, of being
submitted despite political democracy to the absolutist power of the
owner in the factory society. The quest for fellowship, for community
and personal dignity could scarcely be satisfied for the working man.
Msgr. August Pieper, the foremost leader of the Catholic Social Movement in Germany, pointed out rightly that Socialism was a betrayed, frustrated love. The social and juridical theory of Socalism simply saw
buyers and sellers of labor-power, of a quasi-commodity and was only
interested in the protection of contractual and property rights which were
given the dignity of Natural Rights. Because of this lack of realistic insight they used the Natural Rights Theory to prohibit or void for decades
the attempts of the State to do away by social legislation with objective
injustices such as workers being permitted to help themselves in forming
their unions, class-organizations which gave them both dignity and bargaining power.
The grave mistake of extreme individualism was that it could not see
that all lasting, stable societies-the state, the family, the university,
the factory-may be and are produced by a contract, but that once the
contract has served as the procreator of the concrete society, the common
good or end of the latter and the resulting objective functions, duties and
rights gain a life and a validity of their own, become independent, as it
were, from subjective wills. For such contracts are status-contracts. I
am free to enter or not to enter by a truly free contract, i.e., the marriage status. Once I have done so then the objective end and the objective
norms of the status oblige me; the principle being that he who wills that
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society and its end must will also all the essential means and norms implied
in the end and nature of that society. It is illogical to try to enjoy the subjective advantages of such societies while repudiating the essentially connected duties and sacrifices. The criticized individualism sinned by overlooking the fact that there are, besides the contracts dealing with the transfer of things, of rights, of credit, etc. also status-contracts which establish
communities of a lasting character which are specifically different from
other contracts. Canon Law has a fine feeling for this specific difference
when it, for example, defines that a marriage contract under a condition
is void when the condition is in opposition to the end of matrimony.
De facto-one cannot say de jure-the Natural Rights Theory was
applied as a juridical fiction and interpreted with an extreme individualism.
It proved itself to be in stark contradiction to sound reality and to human
social nature. It is, therefore, no wonder that people who saw this contradiction to reality and who were filled with the great ideal of social
justice could fall for the temptation to give up the so misused theory of
Natural Rights, and with it the Natural Law, especially under the impact
of a Pragmatism inspired by a theory of social improvement and of social
justice however confused they were about the objective value of justice,
itself.
The solution is: Return to the Natural Law, not to that of the individualistic era, but rather to the classical Natural Law of which the first is
only a kind of mutilated form. For the classical Natural Law which has been
always critical in character and which has refused to serve as an ancillary
political theory, be it for the positive social status quo or for its radical
revolutionary overthrow, gives us a satisfactory social theory and has a
sound idea of man's essentially social nature.
IV
Characteristic of the classical Natural Law is that the status naturalis
in which the more or less self-sufficient individuals live either in a war
like or in an idyllic pastoral way is of no practical or even theoretical
value. Such was the individualist Natural Law. One might say, however,
that the theory of the status naturalisis a kind of touchstone of Natural
Law theories. For the individualist Natural Law gives us not only a good
clue of its idea of man but is also the status in which the Natural Law or
better the Natural Rights are to be found in their purity. The social contract, initiated for utilitarian reasons or for reasons of security by collective enforcement of positive laws is enacted to preserve and protect these
Natural Rights. So it is in Locke's doctrine. But for the classical Natural
Law the status naturalis, either as a logical postulate or as an historical
fact, plays no role whatsoever because man is by nature a social and political being. To live in societies and communities and in states is not the
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result of utilitarian consideration but the result of the fuller development
of all the essential social dispositions of man's nature. This can only be
fully realized and reach perfection in numerous societies in which each
serves the realization of a particular common good in their organic whole
and forms the state with its political common good, and with the order of
Law as its primary content; and the states, as the forms of existence for
the nations and peoples, are formed from that perfect society, Mankind,
concretized in the community of Nations. It is called perfect because the
process of the development of the social nature of man reaches its full intentional realization in the state and finally in Mankind. Civilization, from
civis, means nothing else than this process of ever more perfect, ever more
rich realization of all the potentialities of man's nature in a hierarchy of values, actualized by particular societies in their common goods. Aristotle could
therefore say that the state-but that is valid for more societies than only
the state-is logically prior to the individual because the latter reaches
his perfection as a citizen living in a State.
We do not start with a fictional status naturalis in which man existed
as a quasi self-sufficient individual and which he left for utilitarian, even
material, reasons or for greater economic security. We see man being
begotten of the union of man and woman in the protected and protective
enclosure of the family. We see man being begotten of an eminently
social act, however much it be surrounded by emotions and the urges of
the animal part of man. We see man being born and grow up in the loving circle of the family, the first, foremost and indispensable educative
society. We see the family again as the member of many societies, the
neighborhood, the village or town, the school-district, and last, but by no
means least, the parish and the Church, all of them being, as it were, embedded in and protected by the order and the institutions of the great political community of the nation, which is on its part again a member of the
community of nations with its law and its specific common good: pax et
justitia. We do not perceive social reality, this hierarchy of common
goods and the specific societies which realize them to be the result of
merely external forces as Marx does, or of blind forces of biological evolution as others do. No, all these societies, from those that serve the production of material goods to those that administer to the spiritual values,
are the free actualization of man's social nature and his intrinsic
potentialities.
Societies are not only, or even primarily, the product of material wants
and their satisfaction, of utilitarian considerations, of the selfish realization of calculable self-interest or self-expression. There are natural societies which owe their existence to such motivation. Because man is a
soul-matter compound, the old adage, Primum vivere, deinde philosophari
holds true; the "Lebenssorge" which the existentialists have stressed as
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against the unrealistic intellectualism of irresponsible "clerics" is primary
in time but not in value; economics is also a human activity permeated
by man's spiritual nature, and part of human culture, though neither the
classical laissez-faire school nor Marx have seen this irrefutable fact.
Economic societies are neither the only societies there are, nor can
they exist without the support of the moral and spiritual part of man's
nature. Business is not charity. True, but no business enterprise as a
human institution can succeed without the spirit of friendship, of free cooperation, of mutual respect for human dignity.
That man is by nature social means also that to man, in his essence, belong certain acts, spontaneously, freely elicited from the innermost center
of the person which are social insofar as they find the fulfilment of their
intentional essence only by the answer of another person. The act of love
in all its forms and "objects"-if such a term is at all permitted-such
as friendship, conjugal love, patriotism, comradeship, brotherhood,
parental and filial love and finally Divine Charity, all involve another
person, and are a trustful surrender of ourselves to other persons with a
readiness to sacrifice self-interest and material things. We grow, we gain
in personal values by love which is value-producing and implies the most
tender respect for the other person. Love in all its forms is so fundamentally an essential human act, a community-building act, that the man
without any love becomes "inhuman." The "Ego" then demands the
"Thou" and becomes conscious of itself in the form of "We." Love in all
its forms is an unconditionally essential act of man's nature. A world
without love is an inhuman world. What is so frightening in the totalitarian state is the utter lack of mutual trusting love in all its forms. In the
thoroughly "Socialist" state, man is most lonely. The immense social import of all forms of love is that they are communicable to the many. It is
meaningful when the Pope speaks of loving all the faithful with equal love
or to say that the mother of one child does not love her child five times
more than does the mother of five children. Material goods are not in the
same way communicable. They are more private. They exclude others.
But spiritual goods are communicable, are more therefore communityforming than are material goods. The homo economicus is an unrealistic
construction.
Descartes said: Cogito, ergo sum. Wiser men have said: Cogito, ergo
sumus and Cogitor, ergo sum. They wanted to point out that even the act
of thinking, the innermost act of man, has a social intention. For when
I think, I think in words (logoi). In thinking I speak; to speak is again
a fundamental social act. I communicate my inner thought, my sentiments, my will. Leo XIII said, applying an old wisdom, that man is a
speaking being, that language is a most elementary community-building
property of man.
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Our social nature is thus not based only on our bodily nature, on material wants and their satisfaction through economic, self-interest-motivated
activity. Social we are in soul and body. We can from there build up a
better theory of Natural Rights than could the individualist Natural Law.
For they are based on our being persons, as rational beings masters of our
own acts and thus fully responsible for them.
As persons we are of highest value, carrying over into social life. Therefore, all social forms, in the ultimate sense, are of service-character to the
persons. They have reflected value, because they help the perfection,
the full development of all the God-given potentialities of the persons,
that establish and live in the social forms, in the very process of civilization.
From there follows a first principle of Natural Law: Help to realize
the common good of all legitimate societies (i.e. such societies which serve
to realize human values) and omit all acts contradictory to the common
good (as long as you are a member, of course), and in case of conflict
prefer the society with the higher common good. It is thus the common
good, the end of a society that determines its rank in the hierarchy of
societies, not the number of its members nor the intensity of the collective
feelings of belonging together. The principle of subsidiarity, that primary principle of our social philosophy, is thus asserted. For it follows
from the objective hierarchy of common goods that whatever the lower"
society can satisfactorily realize should not be taken over by the "higher"
society. Grave violations of this principle, may they even be rationalized
as producing greater administrative efficiency, all too easily lead to the
totalitarian state.
Thus the social process of the ever more perfect actualization of all the
potentialities that are implicit in the term "Social Nature" produces an
ever more varied multitude of societies between the so-called natural and
necessary societies-the family, the town, the state and mankind. And
this growth of societies is the very process of civilization. This is in opposition to the individualist view which unrealistically perceived only the
multitude of free and equal individuals, bound together by short-term
contracts and motivated only by their separate self-interest. It is in opposition to the State, seeing in any stable group-organization like Rousseau
did, a violation of the political common good. Thus the typically individualist antinomy appeared; Individual vs. State, as Leo
I said, the
cnaked" individual that now in order to protect itself watches jealously
over its individual rights. It did not see that its main protection against
the State ought and is to be founded on numerous intermediary societies
which, so to speak, mediate the undeniably corrupting influence of State
power in relation to the individual and thus afford effective social protection. This is what actually developed even during the dominance of individualism. For the right of association is just as important as the right
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to life, liberty and property: the imprescriptible right to found families,
private educational institutions, religious communities, associations for
cultural, artistic, charitable common ends, for economic enterprise and
labor unions, for the realization of political ideals and so on. Be it remarked here that America was saved from the harshness of individualism
because, as the Toqueville pointed out, it became a country in which
numerous free associations flourished. That perhaps explains among
other factors too, why class consciousness, that emotional fertile soil for
the growth of Marxist socialism, did not grow to dangerous proportions
in this country of tremendous capitalist expansion, but without a powerful
proletarian socialism.
V
Individualism and its concept of natural rights also wanted to disprove and guard against a theory of the nature of societies in general and
of the state in particular, namely, especially the State was a substantial
being of which the individuals were only dependent parts, cells as it were,
in the super-organism of the State. To view the State especially so,
is a perennal temptation; Hobbes and Rousseau, Plato to a degree and
some Romantics, especially Hegel, almost wholly did so, and the totalitarian ideologies of our time completely have fallen to that temptation.
It is not necessary in order to escape from this temptation to insist
on the subjective contractual view of individualism. The truth, as it
does so often, lies in the middle. All societies are of accidental, not of
substantial being. They exist only within the individual persons that
form them, not outside and not above them. They exist in the intentional
"csocial" acts becoming mostly habitual of the persons that form a society,
acts and habits which have as their intentional end the realization of the
common good, in which all members distributively participate. Because
of our compound nature (matter-soul) we regulate these acts by "rules and
laws," by a "constitution"--ubi societas, ibi jus-which receive their
obligatory character from legitimacy, legality, and ultimately from the
common good. Furthermore societies, especially in the perfection of
moral persons, acquire "rights," "property," a duration or perpetuality,
(perpetual union, perpetual foundation) which seems to present an independence of a substantial kind, but is not; and in order to make that
manifest ad visible, societies are represented by external symbols, just
as external things, the buildings and grounds for instance, of a university
or of a Bar Association may be and are necessary for the realization of
the common good. Juridical genius has put, as it were, a legal personality
between the members who are mortal and are each for himself indifferent
to the existence of the society on the one hand and the visible representation the laws, the symbols, and the material things on the other. But this is
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not a person in the same way as each of us is a person. Only per analogiarn
may we talk of the conscience of a society, of its will, of its mind. No human
society is a substantial being.
On the other hand it is not wholly in the arbitrary wills of the individuals that form it. In relation to these wills, it has degrees of objectivity
and of independence. We are free to form societies, to realize a particular
common good; once we have formed it, given it a constitution, then we
are, as long as we are members, determined by its common good, its constitution and by-laws. They become, so to speak, independent of the individual wills. Most clearly this may be seen i the Family and the State.
All societal contracts by which a society is formed, even the most ephemeral, are status-contracts; they establish an objective status with laws,
with officers, that is, with authorities, to act for, to decide for, to represent legally the society. Especially do State and Family owe their existence to a status-contract, and since they are necessary societies by the
social nature of man, there is no problem of my being bound by their
constitutions and common goods because in refusing to be bound I would
violate the rule: realize your full human social nature. Loyalty to the
country under which laws I live, in which common good I participate, is
an objective duty independent of my will needing no social contract as its
basis. Similarly in the marital society and the family, I am free to marry
or not. But once I have made the status-contract of marriage then I am
bound by the end and common good of that society. The latter cannot
become the subject of conditions of arbitrary wills. The indissoluble
character of the marriage bond according to the fully developed, classical
Natural Law is based on the objective end, the common good of the family, the dignity of the person and of human love all of which are objective
values, independent of subjective predilections and arbitrary wills. I am
free to join the community of a Catholic university, to acquire the status
of a professor. Even if there were no rule forbidding me specifically to
teach formal heresy, I could not plead academic freedom, if I would teach
intentionally and knowingly a formal heresy, because that would be an
objective violation of the end and common good of the university-society,
that is objectively superior to my arbitrary will.
This objectivity of the common good of all societies, the fact that the
contracts establishing societies are status-contracts by which different,
"inequal," higher and lower, functions become necessary to realize the
common good, was much too much overlooked by individualistic Natural
Law. It could thus not actually reach human reality; it failed to solve
human social problems and became so more and more a mere ideological
defense of vested interests. Classical Natural Law, having a true idea of
man as a person with a profoundly social nature, so that the full realization of all the individual potentialities needs numerous societies from the
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family to State and Mankind will be able to solve the problems which
together with the religious theological problems form the "Crisis of Our
Time."
Human social nature implicitly contains numerous values which can
only be realized in and by societies, by co-operation under objective constitutions and rules directed by true authorities who receive their ultimate
legitimacy by service to the common good whatever the form of appointment might be. The law and the State does not produce these many
societies, it may regulate and ought to protect them under conscientious
observation of the principle of subsidiarity. The jurists have in this matter an important office; we read in the first book of Justinian's Digest of
Roman Law that someone, not without cause, called them priests because
they venerate Justice and profess the knowledge of what is good and
equitable. They adhere, if I am right, to the true, not the false,
philosophy.
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